基于云爆弹二次引信的作用历程,分析了云爆弹二次引信在弹道终点可能受到的冲击波、电磁辐射等干扰因素及其特征,从二次引信弹道设计、电路设计、结构设计等方面提出了抗干扰设计方法。通过静爆试验对比了二次引信独立设计和电缆线连接设计结构下二次引信的抗干扰能力,试验结果表明,采用独立结构设计的二次引信的抗干扰能力更好,二次引信在抛洒药柱爆炸之后能够在装订时刻输出正常点火信号;而采用电缆连接的二次引信出现了未能在指定时刻发出点火指令的问题,引信内元器件发生电学失效为炸药爆炸产生的电磁辐射通过场线耦合的方式进入引信导致的损坏;实验工况下引起的脉冲干扰电流持续时间可以达到百ns量级,峰值电流达到数十A,能够直接对引信单片机及接口电路产生损伤。

This study commences with an examination of the operational sequence of the secondary fuze in a fuel-air explosive (FAE) munition, analyzing the potential interference factors such as shock waves and electromagnetic radiation, as well as their characteristics, that the secondary fuze may encounter at the terminal phase of the trajectory. Counter-interference design methods for the secondary fuze are proposed from various perspectives, including trajectory design, circuit design, and structural design. Static detonation experiments were conducted to compare the interference-resistance capabilities of the secondary fuze under two different configurations: independent design and cable-connected design. The experimental results indicate that the secondary fuze with an independent structural design exhibits superior interference-resistance, capable of emitting a normal ignition signal at the preset timing following the explosion of the dispersed charge. In contrast, the secondary fuze with a cable-connected design failed to issue an ignition command at the designated moment, resulting in electrical failure of the components within the fuze. It is postulated that the electromagnetic radiation generated by the detonation of the explosive charge enters the fuze through field-line coupling, thereby causing damage to the fuze. Furthermore, the experimental results demonstrate that under the conditions of this study, the pulse interference current induced has a duration reaching the order of hundreds of nanoseconds, with a peak current reaching tens of amperes, which is sufficient to directly inflict damage on the microcontroller and interface circuits of the fuze.